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Space of Mediation: Labour Migration, 
Intermediaries and the State in 
Indonesia and China since the 
Nineteenth Century
Johan Lindquist1 and Biao Xiang2
It has been increasingly recognized among scholars that migration is 
mediated by different actors, including those who appear far removed from 
migrants (Feldman, 2012). Existing literature has pointed out that focusing on 
processes of mediation provides us with a critical lens to appreciate the relation 
between migration and broader social change (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013; 
Sørensen and Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2013; Walters, 2015). Arguably this is particu-
larly evident in Asia where brokers have historically had a crucial role in labour 
migration (Lindquist, Xiang and Yeoh, 2012). In light of this, the article asks how 
specific modes of migration mediation have changed over time in Asia, espe-
cially in relation to the state. This question will be addressed by examining the 
case of low-skilled international labour outmigration from China and Indonesia 
since the nineteenth century.
Our comparison is grounded in what we term “spaces of mediation.” Space 
of mediation is a conceptual construction, and not a self-evident empirical 
object. We use “space” in order to capture the complex connections among 
multiple actors, which are neither clearly localized nor bounded, but centered 
on the mediation of migration. This space forms an emergent arena of practices 
and is defined by a constantly changing configuration of multiple connections. 
The central actors of this space are neither migrants nor state regulators, but 
are nevertheless indispensable to both the process of and the governance of 
migration. These actors address the demands of migrants and regulators, but 
always in the light of their own interests. In the contemporary era, they include 
commercial recruitment intermediaries — big and small, formal and informal — 
as well as quasi-government public institutions (such as business associations), 
NGOs and public media. The multidirectional connections among these actors 
and the entanglement between their divergent concerns create quasi-autono-
mous dynamics that actively shape the mediation process. A historical perspec-
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tive suggests not only the enduring centrality of the space of mediation in terms 
of organizing labour circulation, but also ongoing shifts in the balance of power 
in relation to the state. Taking the “space” of mediation as an entry-point, we 
investigate how states play their roles in practice without assuming the existence 
of an autonomous and bounded “state” separated from “society” or “market.”
This article compares the space of migration mediation in China and 
Indonesia (the Dutch East Indies before 1945) at three modern stages: 1)  the 
period before the entrenchment of the centralized state; 2)  the era of national 
development under the centralized state; and 3) the period since the late 1990s 
that has been characterized by increasing deregulation in some aspects and 
re-regulation in others (cf.  Table  1). Our comparison shows that, despite the 
obvious differences between the two states, the space of mediation has followed 
a comparable evolution. Before China and Indonesia became effectively central-
ized, the space of mediation was socially autonomous, occupied by identifiable 
social groups that often served as a link between otherwise separated worlds. 
In the era of national development, the centralized states aimed to control the 
space of mediation directly, in terms of both business ownership and operational 
methods. In the late 1990s the space of mediation in both Indonesia and China 
underwent a double transformation. First, intermediaries increasingly regained 
economic autonomy in the wake of market liberalization. In China, public institu-
tions were explicitly banned from commercial labour brokerage, which brought 
in various kinds of private players and the space expanded rapidly in scope. In 
Indonesia, economic liberalization and the dismantling of Suharto’s monopolies 
led to a dramatic growth of labour recruitment companies. Second, however, 
independent business ownership has not brought about the form of social 
autonomy that pre-1960s intermediaries enjoyed. States control intermediaries 
through licensing and de-licensing, monitoring of business conduct, and guide-
lines about how different types of intermediaries should work together. Both 
states are hands-off in spirit, hands-on in operation. The following Table summa-
rizes the historical changes.
Table 1: Historical Changes in the Space of Mediation of Labour Migration































This comparison is part of our on-going conversation based on long-term 
field research on labour migration from Indonesia and China over the last two 
decades. Most recently Lindquist has worked on outmigration from Indonesia, 
particularly the island of Lombok (ten months between 2007 and 2017), and Xiang 
on northeast China, particularly Liaoning province (a total of twelve months 
between 2004 and 2008, and in 2011 and 2017). Lombok is a major sending area 
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for male oil palm plantation workers to Malaysia and women migrants to Asia and 
the Middle East, which was partially driven by the economic hardships resulting 
from the 1997 Asian financial crisis.3 Liaoning Province emerged as a new 
emigration place in the 1990s amidst massive labour layoffs resulting from the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises that escalated in 1998. We both realized 
that, in order to deepen our understanding of the present, we needed to trace 
it back historically. This article represents fieldwork-informed, historically-based, 
and comparatively-framed research. It is fieldwork-informed in the sense that 
our central theoretical question, namely the relation between intermediaries and 
the state, was derived from our field research on the contemporary condition. 
We have collected historical data from documentary research. Our analysis of 
the changes after the mid-twentieth century is based on a mix of information 
sources, which include scholarly publications, government documents, inter-
views and field observations. The article is comparatively-framed not only in the 
sense that it discerns differences and similarities between Indonesia and China, 
but more importantly, maps continuities and discontinuities across historical 
stages through comparisons between the two countries. Instead of confining our 
analysis to labour migration intermediaries alone, we investigate changes in the 
general intermediary classes between the state and the local society, of which 
migration intermediaries have been a part.
The “Link Society” Model of the Late Nineteenth 
and Early Twentieth Centuries
Large-scale labour migration to and from Asia was initiated in the first half 
of the nineteenth century as the demand for natural resources across the region 
exploded in the wake of capitalist expansion, made possible by colonial inter-
vention and transportation innovations such as the steamship. In this process, 
Asia experienced a “mobility revolution” (Amrith, 2011: 25-29). An estimated 
average of 150,000 Chinese emigrated annually, leading the Chinese popula-
tion in Southeast Asia to increase ten-fold between 1840 and 1949 (Cao, 1997: 
531).4 Chinese migrants were initially the main source of labour in plantations 
and mines in the outer islands of the Dutch East Indies, but near the end of the 
nineteenth century the Dutch colonial state increasingly turned to the growing 
Javanese population to replace them (Houben, 2018). In this process, Javanese 
migrants became indentured labourers in plantation belts and mining enclaves 
in the outer islands of the Dutch East Indies and further afield in Surinam, 
Malaya, and New Caledonia (Hoefte and Meel, 2018).
An important part of the mobility revolution was the emergence of a space 
of mediation that linked previously separate societies, either between the 
colonial and the native, or between formal systems and informal social life, 
which together with new forms of transport made the actual recruitment and 
3 In 2011 East and Central Lombok were the Indonesian regencies with the second 
and fourth largest number of migrants departing during that year, respectively. Data 
from the National Agency for the Protection and Placement of International Migrant 
Workers (BNP2TKI).
4 In the 1850s there were about 1 million Chinese in Southeast Asia (Zhuang, 1994: 55), 
and the population increased to more than 7 million in the 1920s and to 10 million in the 
1940s (Guo, 1989: 118).
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movement of labour across great distances possible. In the Dutch East Indies, 
indirect colonial rule was institutionalized as a system of intermediaries between 
populations and societal spheres. The idea of the schakel or “link” society 
suggested that cultural links could serve as a “channel” connecting “strange 
worlds” (Abdullah, 1978: 148, cited in Kuitenbouwer, 1980: 105). While ethnic 
Chinese functioned as middlemen in the colonial economy (Rush, 1990), the 
Javanese priyayi aristocracy had a similar role in the political and bureaucratic 
spheres (Sutherland, 1979), and local strongmen, jago, exchanged “order” for 
the right to engage in extortion, theft, and banditry (Wilson, 2015: 11-13).5 Labour 
migration came to be conceived and organised in similar terms thus forming the 
basis for the space of mediation. In China, a new space of mediation emerged 
because the traditional intermediary structure centered on gentries collapsed, 
and new linkages had to be made between local societies and foreign powers 
that demanded labour. In the space of mediation in both countries, private 
labour brokers and (quasi)colonial officers played important roles by creating 
infrastructure such as temporary housing and labour depots, as well as funding 
migration itself (Kaur, 2004: 51).
In the Dutch East Indies, the recruitment of Chinese migrants was initially 
handled by Chinese brokers via the British Straits Settlements, but as fees 
increased Dutch private companies received permission to recruit in China 
beginning in 1888 (Termorshuizen, 2008: 272-273). Even with direct recruit-
ment Chinese labour remained expensive and was increasingly replaced by 
Javanese migrants recruited by Dutch firms (Houben, 1999a: 3). With a series 
of Coolie Ordinances aimed to protect the interests of plantation companies by 
outlining sanctions against workers who violated contracts (Breman, 1990: 63; 
Tirtosudarmo, 2001: 203), the Dutch attempted to create the basis for an admin-
istrative and legal system that would guarantee the circulation of indentured 
labour to the plantation belts in outer islands (Houben, 1999a: 3). The number 
of migrants deployed to the outer islands, East Sumatra in particular, was far 
greater than those sent abroad to other Dutch colonies, such as Surinam, and 
English and French colonies such as Malaya and New Caledonia, as the colonial 
authorities in the East Indies aimed to monopolize the substantial Javanese 
labour reserve (Houben, 2018: 62-63).
The coercive and criticized Cultivation System (1830-1870), based on 
Javanese corvée labour, gave way to the Ethical Policy (1901), which purported 
to improve the welfare of colonial subjects. In this process, there was a rapid 
increase in the number of specialized government departments (Cribb, 1993: 
233; see also Sutherland, 1979: 14), and, more generally, a “huge extension of 
the state apparatus deep into native society and a proliferation of its functions” 
(Anderson, 1983: 479). This was evident not least in the context of migration, 
as Javanese migration was perceived both as a way of supplying labour and 
reducing overpopulation. The so-called “colonization” (kolonisasi) program 
was initiated in 1905, which permanently moved Javanese peasants to the 
outer islands (Hardjono, 1988: 427; see also Stoler, 1985: 38), while Recruitment 
Ordinances (in 1909 and 1914) ostensibly aimed to prevent abuses against 
5 In this role, the priyayi became the agents of intensifying state intervention in vaccina-
tion campaigns, taxation, and corvée labor, thus increasingly becoming associated with 
the colonial state (Sutherland, 1979: 16).
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coolies, as an extensive series of regulations were made compulsory for recruit-
ment firms. Firms and their recruiters had to be licensed and have well-main-
tained labour depots in their areas of recruitment, while a limited number of 
recruitment commissionaires (wervingscommissarissen) were in charge of 
surveilling the implementation of these regulations (Houben, 1999b: 32-34). 
Notably, the regulations and broader recruitment system for migrants sent to 
Surinam and other destinations abroad were governed by the same regulations 
as those within the East Indies (Houben, 2018: 62-63).
Labour recruitment on Java was divided between a handful of Dutch 
firms, each with three types of personnel: the mainly European recruiters, the 
Javanese henchmen (handlangers or glundungan) and the Javanese overseers 
(mandor), of whom the latter two would approach prospective migrants. State 
labour inspectors generally blamed henchmen and overseers for engaging 
in deception and extortion and luring villagers to become coolies under false 
pretenses (Houben, 1999b: 30). Plantation corporations in the outer islands, 
with the support of colonial officials who complained that costs were too high 
while anticipating that the commercial recruitment agencies would not be able 
to deliver enough workers, created their own recruitment systems (Stoler, 1985: 
28; Houben, 1999b: 34). The so-called personal recruitment system was based 
on sending workers back to Java to recruit family members and fellow villagers. 
These laukeh (Hokkien for “veteran”) were to be monitored by European repre-
sentatives of the companies along the way and were likely modeled on earlier 
forms of direct recruitment in China. Although apparently different, in practice 
the “two systems were virtually identical” since they made use of the same 
village-level recruiters (Houben, 1999b: 36), thus illustrating how attempts to 
establish new forms of labour recruitment were inevitably embedded in already 
existing networks and relationships (Ibid.: 27).
The predominance of firms and extensive use of village-level recruiters 
highlight the multiple levels of mediation between the state and prospective 
migrants that characterized the “link society”, and which created the basis 
for a space of mediation for labour migration. This space was shaped as the 
“village” itself became a site of colonial concern (Breman, 1988). During the 
Cultivation System, the Javanese peasant economy had become organized on 
a territorial basis by the colonial state, as the village became the primary unit 
for the extraction of labour and taxes (Breman, 1988: 16). The creation of travel 
passes further regulated labour mobility and positioned the village chief in a 
mediating position of power (Barker, 1999: 127-128), not least when it came to 
the recruitment of migrant labour (Termorshuizen, 2008: 267). During the colo-
nization program, migrants were often chosen by village chiefs who could take 
the opportunity to displace unwanted residents (Ibid.: 2008: 294). Although it 
was critical for priyayi to retain good relations with village heads because of the 
colonial demands for rust en orde (peace and order) they increasingly belonged 
to different social worlds. As Stoler (1985: 25) has put it, “peasants remained 
village residents whose contact with the colonial apparatus was cushioned 
and muted by a layer of native civil servants.” It was thus the social rather than 
economic autonomy of the village that made brokers both necessary and a 
problem for labour recruitment companies and colonial authorities.
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As noted, China’s involvement in the mobility revolution was very different. 
The dramatic increase of outmigration after 1860 was directly related to the 
encroachment of Chinese sovereignty and the displacement of one space of 
mediation composed by traditional locally rooted gentries by another consisting 
of commercial players and local thugs backed by foreign powers. In imperial 
China, gentry in the countryside functioned as a link between a centralized but 
small bureaucracy, on the one hand, and the massive rural society, on the other 
(Wu and Fei, 1948). They assisted the imperial state with ensuring social order 
(including preventing large-scale outmigration either to other parts of China or 
overseas) (see Kuhn, 2008), maintaining public programs such as education and 
irrigation, and collecting taxes. In turn they represented the local society in nego-
tiating with the state, particularly regarding tax deduction and relief provision in 
years of hardship.
This space of mediation was undermined with the decline of central power 
and recurring social upheavals. The gentry scholars’s intermediary role was 
overtaken by entrepreneurial, and often predatory individuals who had connec-
tions with the fragile modern state and foreign powers (Duara, 1987). After 
humiliating defeats in two Opium Wars (1839-1842, and 1856), the Qing court 
was forced to sign the Beijing Treaty in 1860, which conferred foreign companies 
the freedom to recruit workers in China to feed the expanding colonial economy 
worldwide, but primarily in Southeast Asia. Major colonial powers set up recruit-
ment bureaus in key cities and dispatched officers to different parts of China, 
who in turn relied on local brokers to recruit workers. Called ketou (head of 
guests) or zhuzaitou (head of piggy), the local brokers often deceived or even 
kidnapped young men to port cities, particularly Hong Kong, where they were 
trafficked overseas. Colonial ports became the focal points of this early form of 
human smuggling, and triad gangs played an important role in recruitment (Ong, 
1995). Recognizing the widespread problems, the Qing government banned 
outmigration recruitment in 1891, and in 1905 the governor of Guangdong, one 
of the major migrants sending areas, ordered all recruitment agencies to be 
closed down. But with the support of foreign consular offices, both foreign and 
local recruiters continued with the business (e.g. Mao, 2004, see also Cao, 1997). 
Traditional gentries and other local leaders were helpless, though some did 
launch campaigns attempting to stop the recruitment, including standing in the 
ports to dissuade men from boarding recruiters’ boats. The mediation process 
that linked foreign powers and Chinese local societies remained unregulated 
after free passage workers replaced indentured workers as the main channel of 
outmigration in 1893. An estimated 7 million Chinese were brought overseas by 
these intermediaries (Chen Hansheng cited in Li, 2002: 99).
Between 1915 and 1918 Russia, France and Britain recruited an estimated 
300,000 Chinese workers to support their First World War efforts, for instance as 
transport workers and trench builders (see Zhang, 2009; Xu, 2011; O’Neill, 2014; 
Bailey, 2014; Ma, 2015; Wood and Arnander, 2016). The workers were recruited 
by Chinese companies with foreign connections, or sometimes by foreign 
agents directly, and were tacitly endorsed, but hardly regulated, by the Chinese 
government. Most were not properly informed about the war conditions (Li, 
2002: 99-113). Appalled by the unethical recruitment procedure and the abuse 
that the workers faced overseas, particularly in France, a group of revolution-
aries belonging to the Association for Work-Study in France (established in 1912) 
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experimented with alternative recruitment methods in 1916. They successfully 
negotiated with the French government and employers to ensure equal pay for 
Chinese workers to study French at work, direct payment of travel costs and 
wages to workers rather than through recruiters. The Association then worked 
with education officers and primary school teachers in hinterland China to recruit 
literate workers without criminal records, although the number was small (Li, 
2002: 106-107; Dirlik, 1991: 326). It is important to note that active participants 
in the Work-Study in France Movement included Mao Zedong (who actively 
promoted the movement and recruited a number of worker-students in his home 
province Hunan, though he did not go to France himself), Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, 
Deng Xiaoping and other prominent Communist leaders. As such, the space of 
mediation was not only socially autonomous, but also became politically revo-
lutionary.
Regardless of the nature of these intermediaries, be they traditional aristo-
crats or modern entrepreneurs, their social autonomy caused grave concerns 
for modernizing state. This was true in the Dutch East Indies as well, where 
even before independence in 1945, the colonial state, while heavily reliant on 
intermediaries, was also keen to curtail them. While the Recruitment Ordinances 
aimed to regulate labour recruitment through documentation, officials hoped 
that dactyloscopy, the science of fingerprint identification, would form the basis 
for a modern labour system in the Indies through the registration and, as Dutch 
experts put it, the “sieving” of contract workers (Mrazék, 2002: 101-102). While 
there was a predictable lack of implementation in the context of labour migration, 
the proposed use of dactyloscopy was an example of the “fetishization of the 
tools of surveillance” that characterized the Dutch regime (Barker, 1999: 166). In 
the divided Dutch colonial society and administration these technologies were 
imagined as bridging a gap that was inhabited by brokers (see, for instance, 
Kuitenbrouwer, 1980; Barker and Van Klinken, 2009: 22) who controlled access 
to prospective migrants independently of any broader recruitment system that 
was created by state or market actors.
In China, intermediaries were of such a great concern that they stood out as 
a rare common enemy of diverse social groups. Conservative mandarins, radical 
reformists and socialist revolutionists all “placed the problem of controlling or 
eliminating middlemen near the top of China’s constitutional agenda” (Kuhn, 
2002: 91). The fact that the Republic of China, which was established in 1912, 
repeatedly failed to control such intermediaries as those who recruited workers 
for Europe during the First World War is widely seen as a result of its failure in 
unifying China, centralizing power and protecting sovereignty, a fundamental 
weakness that for many had to be overcome through radical social changes.
As McKeown has pointed out more broadly, with the rise of liberalism and 
“free” labour (as opposed to indentured or debt-bondage labour), informal 
recruiters were increasingly demonized and connected to premodern forms of 
labour organization, despite the fact that most were a product of the capitalist 
economies and mass migrations associated with modernity (McKeown, 2008: 
116). In contrast to social relationships, an emerging form of proceduralism 
based on documentation or technologies such as fingerprinting increasingly 
came to be seen as a mode of regulating mobility (Ibid.: chapter 10). As is clear 
from both cases, however, the space of mediation that came to be inhabited by 
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various kinds of brokers was difficult to regulate, not least because the state 
lacked the basic capacity to penetrate local societies that were separated from 
the modern bureaucracy.
Space of Mediation as a State Project 
for National Development
The link society model was fundamentally dismantled by the centralized 
states in both Indonesia and China, and new types of mediation were put in 
place. The early post-colonial Indonesian state was burdened by debt from the 
war and distinguished by the penetration of the state by societal groups that 
gained influence during the revolution and independence from the Netherlands, 
between 1945 and 1949. In this process, the state bureaucracy grew ten-fold 
between 1940 and 1968 to 2.5 million civil servants (Anderson, 1983: 482-483). 
However, the rise of Suharto’s New Order regime, following the destruction of 
the communist party beginning in 1965, led to the reestablishment of the power 
of the state vis-à-vis society, as the Indonesian state, by way of the military, was 
able to nationalize foreign corporations. Power was thus increasingly consol-
idated and centred on the Suharto family and their crony capitalist network. 
Furthermore, the Indonesian family planning and transmigration programs are 
intimately connected with the power of the New Order state to reach into the 
intimate spheres of everyday life (Warwick, 1986). The latter was based on the 
Dutch colonization program, renamed transmigrasi when it was initiated in 1950, 
as the Indonesian state revived the process of moving peasants from overpop-
ulated Java, in particular, to less densely populated areas in the outer islands 
(Tirtosudarmo, 2009). The two programs shared comparable ambitions with 
regard to demographic engineering and nation-building, as well as transforming 
livelihoods, and were supported by international organizations such as the World 
Bank (Tirtosudarmo, 2001).
What is particularly noteworthy, primarily in light of this article, was the use 
of the petugas lapangan, or “field agent”, who recruited “acceptors” (akseptor) 
in family planning programs in the early 1970s and supported new arrivals 
in the transmigration program. In the context of family planning, the petugas 
lapangan was eventually given the status of civil servant (Niehof and Lubis, 
2003: 126-127), thus signaling the state’s attempt to directly access the village 
and thereby control the space of mediation. The term itself connotes a connec-
tion to a bureaucracy and thereby an extension of the state apparatus, rather 
than a broker whose allegiances are divided, thus pointing beyond the “link 
society” that characterized the colonial era towards a more expansive form 
of engagement that has been termed “bureaucratic authoritarianism” (King, 
1982). After the 1997 economic crisis, the petugas lapangan became increasingly 
critical in the recruitment process, as well as a site of state regulation, with the 
rise of international migration, a point we will return to later.
A national overseas labour migration program was first conceptualized by the 
Indonesian government in the late 1960s, partly in response to transmigration’s 
limited effects on the rising problem of unemployment. From the beginning, a 
key task of the Ministry of Manpower was to gain control over already existing 
flows of international migration, by creating a space of mediation through 
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the licensing of private recruitment companies. It took more than a decade, 
however, before international labour migration became an explicit dimension 
of national development. In the wake of the global recession in the early 1980s, 
and particularly after the global slump in oil prices in 1986, which seriously 
affected the Indonesian economy, state bureaucrats and policymakers saw inter-
national labour migration, primarily female domestic workers to Saudi Arabia, 
as a possible solution to both Indonesia’s foreign exchange and labour market 
problems (Cremer, 1988; Palmer, 2016: Chapter 2). In order to more efficiently 
regulate increasing flows of migrants, and to convince migrants to choose docu-
mented over undocumented migration, the Centre of Overseas Employment 
(Pusat AKAN) was created within the Department of Manpower in 1984.6
Migration and trade were considered explicitly together, thus placing interna-
tional migration in the context of broader economic policy (Palmer, 2016: 26-28). 
In fact, there was a general agreement that the welfare and rights of Indonesian 
workers should not take precedent over national development. In line with this, 
and in order to make Indonesian workers more competitive — as the country 
was a latecomer to labour export compared to the Philippines — the costs of 
recruitment were shifted from employers to workers (Ibid.: 37). Throughout the 
1980s and 1990s the government regulated licenses for recruitment companies, 
while starting a state-owned company, PT Bijak, in order to influence and 
regulate the market by creating competition and protecting migrants. During this 
period, there was also an expansion of particularly male irregular migration to 
Malaysia. To a certain degree this was a continuation of historical patterns, but 
also an effect of the growth of the Malaysian economy and, in particular, the oil 
palm economy. Much of this migration became increasingly clandestine with the 
growing demands for migration documentation in Indonesia and the gradual 
expansion of the Malaysian deportation regime. Within this space of mediation, 
the tai kong (“ship’s captain” in Chinese), the migrant smuggler, and the calo, 
the murky low-level middleman pervasive in Indonesian everyday life, became a 
critical figure in the movement of Indonesian migrants across the border (Spaan, 
1994; Jones, 2000).
The policy transformations of the 1980s and 1990s thus led to the increasing 
bifurcation of state-controlled female migration and illegally brokered male 
migration. Most licensed recruitment companies were based in Jakarta and 
other major cities, while provincial branch offices recruited villagers, primarily 
Javanese women. With regard to undocumented migration, chains of tai kong 
connected rural villages, border areas, and employers abroad, thereby bypassing 
urban centres. The divisions between the two migration channels were not clear-
cut, however, as both were characterized by unclear boundaries between state 
and non-state actors and depended on village recruiters. As during the colonial 
period, evidence suggests that village heads and return migrants remained 
important in the recruitment process (Spaan, 1994), while state officials at the 
border were engaged in making money off migrants (Jones, 2000).
6 The creation of the centre was influenced by a similar migration-specific government 
agency in the Philippines (Spaan, 1999: 158-159; Palmer, 2016: 31-32). More generally, 
the improvement of state capacities to regulate migration was supported by the ILO and 
UNDP, and was part of a global trend in the 1980s to make international migration to 
Europe and the United States more legible (Palmer, 2016: 40-41).
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In China, spontaneous labour outmigration was almost completely stopped 
after the Communist Party took over in 1949. State foreign aid projects that 
sent (mainly skilled) personnel to more than 50 developing countries in Latin 
America, Africa, Asia and East Europe (He Xiankai, 1994: 150-162) was the main 
channel of international labour deployment, managed by the Foreign Economic 
Liaison Ministry (later the Ministry of Commerce) with branches in all provinces 
(“bureaus”) and cities (“offices”). When the central government decided to 
start a project overseas, the ministry would require the bureau in a particular 
province with suitable expertise and labour force to implement the project. The 
provincial bureau might in turn ask municipal offices to do the same. As such, 
there was no space of mediation as labour deployment was directly adminis-
tered by state regulators. In the reform era following the Cultural Revolution 
a new space of mediation emerged. This space was initially led by four state-
owned companies set up by the central government in 1982, called “central 
companies”, which carried out international projects on a commercial basis. All 
the central companies started their international business as labour suppliers, 
but soon realized that established players in the industry hardly engaged in 
labour-intensive tasks and instead specialized in design and management. 
The central companies thus increasingly subcontracted labour-intensive tasks 
to other companies in China from the mid-1980s. The subcontractor carried 
out the project independently, and the central company profited from the gap 
between the amount paid by foreign clients and that paid to the subcontractor. 
Even when the subcontractor secured a deal with foreign clients, the project 
had to be presented as that of the central company because the latter were the 
only legitimate “windows” through which Chinese companies could access the 
international market. The subcontractor thus had to pay the central companies 
a “window fee.”
The space of mediation enlarged in the late 1980s with the establishment 
of provincial “windows,” which were formerly Provincial Bureaus of Foreign 
Economic Liaison reorganized into companies. The change was partly prompted 
by the concern that the government’s explicit involvement in international 
projects may be politically inconvenient. Unlike the central companies that 
owned tangible assets and specialized in certain business fields, the main 
function of the provincial windows was to mediate other companies’ interna-
tional businesses. Some local international companies were shell companies 
(“briefcase companies” in Chinese) that picked up overseas deals by using their 
contacts to pass on to others. Window companies were also encouraged to set 
up subsidiaries in provinces, thus enabling local, non-window companies to 
“sail to the ocean on others’ boats” (jiechuan chuhai), as official documents at 
that time had it. In the beginning, the subcontractor companies sent their own 
employees overseas to carry out projects. But with the introduction of contract-
based labour relations aimed at replacing life-long tenure, a reform initiated by 
the central government, they increasingly recruited contract workers through 
open hiring for the overseas projects. Thus at least two steps of mediation were 
involved: first, that of international business by “window” companies; second, 
that of labour by the subcontractors.
Although the state effectively crushed the intermediary class and monop-
olized the legitimate forms of international labour placement, this did not 
eradicate illegal migration, which increased significantly in the 1980s and the 
49
Space of Mediation
1990s. Illegal migration took place outside of state control and was brokered by 
multiple intermediaries, but this does not mean that it was completely unrelated 
to the state; it was partially a result of the emergence of the so-called “nongov-
ernmental channels” of outmigration in southern China. The nongovernmental 
channel was an extension of the space of mediation controlled by the state. From 
the mid-1980s, increasing numbers of employers from Hong Kong and Taiwan 
travelled to Guangdong and Fujian to recruit workers through their personal 
networks for fishery and factory jobs in Southeast Asia and Saipan.7 Provincial 
government encouraged this and initially ordered local window companies to 
help with the workers’ passports, visas and other paperwork for free, though 
most companies soon started charging window fees. Xiamen International, a 
major window company in Fujian province, sent out 40,000 workers between 
1984 and 2004, the majority being nongovernmental, with about 85% hired by 
overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and the south Pacific.8
Non-governmental channels led to large-scale undocumented migration. 
According to a retired cadre whom Xiang interviewed, a major state-owned 
company in Shanghai with the “window” status sent more than 3,000 people 
to Japan every year in late 1980s through the non-governmental channel. The 
company worked with informal brokers who recruited the would-be migrants 
who planned to immigrate to Japan, the company then arranged the paperwork 
for short-term visits or temporary jobs, knowing that most of the migrants 
would over-stay their visas. The fact that this channel was endorsed by state-
owned companies on paper made this form of undocumented migration 
particularly rampant. Another type of undocumented migration was entirely 
brokered by informal networks. These individuals did not register companies, 
and therefore could not provide documents. Transnationally connected, they 
instead transported people into the destination physically, for instance by 
voyaging across the Pacific to North America, or by taking a bus or train across 
Eurasia into western Europe (Smith, 1997; Chin, 1999; Kyle and Liang, 2001; 
Chin, 2003). Although formally criminalized by the state, the critical part of the 
networks, namely the “snakeheads” (also known as “yellow ox” in some parts 
of China) in the migrant-sending communities, were often tacitly tolerated by 
the grassroots authorities. Apart from the deep roots of human smugglers in 
the community, local government also hoped that emigrants would contribute 
to the local economy through remittances (Chin, 2003; Xiang, 2003). In any 
case, it was no longer possible to develop an autonomous space of mediation 
free from state intervention as in pre-modern times. A telling example is the 
role of returned migrants. While returnees were among the most active brokers 
in the pre-modern times because of their transnational networks, they played 
a minimum role in the time of nation-states. This is because returnees, often 
uneducated and unconnected to the state, simply did not have the necessary 
resources to act as brokers in the new context.
7 Beijing allowed Taiwan fishing boats to anchor at designated ports in Fujian; owners of 
the boat often recruited labor on shore nearby. Hong Kong and Taiwan garment factories 
relocated to South Pacific countries and Guam and Saipan of the U.S, in the 1980s and 
1990s in order to avoid tariff imposed by the international textile quota system.
8 Interview with deputy director general, Xiamen International, February 25, 2005, 
Xiamen.
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The existence of undocumented migration, in both Indonesia and China, 
should not be regarded as a sign of state failure in controlling the space of 
mediation. The very fact that undocumented migration is categorized in this way, 
or as “irregular” or “illegal”, is a product of the state’s attempt in monopolizing 
the “legitimate means of movement” (Torpey, 2000: 5). In fact, it is not possible 
to conceptualize “illegal” without reference to “legal” migration. Human 
smugglers had simply remained capable community members if the state had 
not attempted to undermine their social and cultural authority or even crimi-
nalize them. Furthermore, as in Indonesia, it is clear that illegal migration in fact 
was a significant source of income for state officials, thus illustrating how illegal 
channels were related to the state-controlled space of mediation in operation. 
In China, the government launched a series of campaigns against human 
smuggling in the 1990s primarily because the central state regarded undocu-
mented outmigration as a sign of the disobedience of local government (Xiang, 
2003). The crackdown, however, was more a contestation between the central 
and local governments, rather than a battle between legal and illegal spheres. 
These efforts brought about a new configuration of the space of mediation at the 
turn of the millennium, which we will turn to now.
The Professionalization of the Space of Mediation
The space of mediation of labour outmigration from Indonesia and China 
has expanded significantly since the late 1990s. The volume of migration has 
increased rapidly, there has been a liberalization of regulation over individual 
outmigration, and, most importantly, there has been a dramatic growth of 
migration brokerage. At the same time both the Indonesian and Chinese states 
have attempted to shape and control the space of mediation through unprece-
dentedly hands-on regulations. Indonesia has attempted to formalize the rela-
tionship between informal labour recruiters and licensed companies through 
biometric technology and a broader database system, while China has tried 
to develop a system in which, in the words of an official in Liaoning province, 
“agents, officials and migrants all have laws to rely on and rules to follow at 
every step.”9 As detailed below, both countries went through simultaneous 
de-regulation and re-regulation. De-regulation were policy changes that encour-
aged outmigration and allowed for more private players to become legitimate 
migration intermediaries. But at the same time both states set stricter rules for 
licensing and guidelines for the intermediary business, thus a process of re-reg-
ulation. The simultaneous process of de-regulation and re-regulation turned 
the space of mediation into a professional domain open to anyone who was 
qualified and was thus no longer monopolized by public institutions. But as a 
professional domain, only those who satisfy the state requirement regarding 
their professional capacity can become recognized players.
Indonesia witnessed significant transformations during the period after the 
Asian economic crisis and the fall of Suharto in 1998. While the New Order 
was “characterized by a powerful military, centralized decision-making, violent 
repression, and ideological control,” the current era can be framed most broadly 
in terms of “democratization” and “decentralization” (Van Klinken and Barker, 
9 Interview, June 2, 2006, Shenyang, Liaoning province.
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2009: 2); the military has lost much of its power and prestige, there has been a 
dramatic growth of political parties, NGOs, and other civil society groups, and 
political decentralization has given provinces and districts, and thereby local 
actors, greater autonomy. Aspinall (2013) describes Indonesia as a “nation in 
fragments” that should be conceptualized in relation to two sources, namely 
patronage and neoliberalism. More specifically, contemporary Indonesia is 
characterized by decentred clientelism in the context of state decentralization, 
in contrast to the heavily centralized clientelism of Suharto’s New Order, which 
has “shifted power relations within patron-client relationships” and have tipped 
“the balance more in favour of the clients” (Ibid.: 31, emphasis in original). 
This decentred clientelism is particularly evident in the context of international 
migration, as the number of licensed recruitment agencies have increased 
dramatically with the liberalization of licensing and the increasing demand for 
documented migration following the collapse of the Indonesian rupiah. More 
specifically, this decentring is reflected in the increasing power of the petugas 
lapangan who are the actual recruiters in villages across the Indonesia, and who 
have increasingly come to control migrants and thereby profits. The space of 
mediation has thus come to flourish after 1998.
The Asian financial crisis was a watershed for international migration, as 
the collapse of the Indonesian rupiah and highly publicized mass deportations 
of undocumented workers from Malaysia led migrants to turn to documented 
channels.10 The collapse of the Indonesian rupiah and an intensifying Malaysian 
deportation regime aimed at undocumented migrants led to the rapid increase 
in the number of documented migrants, which quadrupled to nearly 800,000 
annually within a decade; the majority female domestic care workers and male 
construction or oil palm workers. Recurring abuses against domestic workers 
abroad, and the widely acknowledged extortion of returning migrants — all in the 
context of an increasingly vibrant civil society — led to an intensifying focus on 
the “protection” (perlindungan) of migrants.11 At the same time there has been 
a dramatic decline in transmigration, not least in the context of political decen-
tralization, through which it has been viewed as marginalizing local populations 
and only benefiting migrants rather than sending communities (Tirtosudarmo, 
2009: 11). In contrast, as in other parts of the world, the remittance economy 
has become the new site for grassroots development, and the migrant has been 
transformed from a site for social engineering into an entrepreneur.
In tandem with political decentralization, there have been attempts to 
centralize the regulation of international migration. In 2006, the National Agency 
for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (Badan Nasional 
Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia, BNP2TKI) was created to 
coordinate government activities, both on the national and provincial levels. 
Licensed recruitment companies are increasingly regulated by the government. 
Each recruitment company must pay a 50,000 US dollar cash bond for licensing 
10 See Hugo (2012: 399) for the increase in documented migration. There is no data 
on the drop in undocumented migration, but on-going fieldwork in migrant-sending 
areas, in tandem with Malaysian deportation programs point to a significant drop (e.g. 
Lindquist, 2010).
11 For instance, a specified migrant reception terminal at Jakarta international airport 
opened in August 1999 (Silvey, 2007).
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and is bound to specific procedures — for instance, a strict process of documen-
tation and compulsory pre-departure training — which increasingly has come to 
integrate commercial and regulatory infrastructures, not least on the provincial 
level where most recruitment takes place. There are also regulations concerning 
the signing of contracts between recruitment companies and employers abroad, 
which must be mediated by Indonesian government representatives. While the 
head offices sign the job orders, it is the provincial branch offices that organize 
the actual recruitment process.
As of 2013 there were 546 licensed recruitment companies (compared to less 
than fifty in the middle of the 1990s) with approximately 4,000 branch offices 
around the country12, as well as an inestimable number of petugas lapangan, 
though these numbers have dropped with the ongoing moratorium on sending 
migrant workers to the Middle East (Platt, 2018). The petugas lapangan who 
recruits and delivers migrants to licensed agencies has in an important sense 
replaced the migrant smuggler, or tai kong, of the earlier era, but is also reminis-
cent of the laukeh from the colonial era. Although in some cases former tai kong 
have become petugas lapangan, the primary difference between the two is that 
while tai kong escorted undocumented migrants across great distances, petugas 
lapangan work within a more constricted space, delivering migrants to local 
recruitment companies while dealing with government paperwork. While the 
term suggests formality, in fact the petugas lapangan works without contracts 
and includes a wide range of actors, including low-level civil servants and return 
migrants. Of critical importance is that they are able to negotiate the interface 
between village environments, government offices, and recruitment companies 
(Lindquist, 2012; see also Spaan and Hillman, 2013).
In order for a villager to become a migrant there is an extensive process of 
documentation. The language associated with documents — tembak, to shoot, or 
jalan tol, toll road, for instance — points to the extra costs involved in accessing 
documents quickly. The road metaphor is apt since the process of documentation 
entails that the petugas lapangan escorts prospective migrants to government 
offices and spends time waiting for documents to be produced. Great distances, 
bad roads, and lack of public transportation make mobility arduous and expensive 
in many areas. Despite the ubiquity of cell phones and that most documented 
migrants now travel directly by airplane rather than overland, it is the movement 
of migrants to the urban-based recruitment company prior to departure that is 
the main logistical problem. It is thus in the space between rural and urban areas 
different brokers temporarily collaborate. In this process, petugas lapangan  — 
particularly those who are most successful and considered reliable by recruitment 
companies — are able to control capital, documents, and the migrants themselves, 
generally without having direct access to foreign markets. Much of this power is 
based on relations of trust with prospective migrants. In this process, what a 
figure who was initially imagined as being an extension of the state apparatus, or 
in the case of international migration, the licensed recruitment company, has in 
practice come to function as a broker between different societal spheres.
12 Lindquist interview with office manager at the head office of APJATI, the Indonesian 
Manpower Services Association (Asosiasi Jasa Tenaga Kerja Indonesia), in Jakarta, 
June 4, 2014. Of the 546 licensed companies, 461 were members of APJATI, and these 
had a total of 3,227 licensed branch offices.
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The petugas lapangan has therefore been at the centre of regulatory reform. 
Beginning in 2012, BNP2TKI in collaboration with APJATI (Asosiasi Jasa Tenaga 
Kerja Indonesia), the Indonesian Manpower Services Association, the national 
organization for licensed recruitment companies, initiated a government-con-
trolled licensing system for petugas lapangan, who were to be registered in a 
database using biometric technology, representing in effect a radical attempt 
to formalize or professionalize the informal and control the space of mediation. 
This was ideally supposed to allow recruitment companies and government 
agencies to regain control over the recruitment process and profits. More 
generally, this was part of BNP2TKI’s broader attempt to create a migrant labour 
database based on biometric technology in an ongoing shift to e-governance 
(Lindquist, 2018). Although some dimensions of these reforms have failed — not 
least because of intra-governmental conflicts (Palmer, 2016) — in the space of 
mediation that has taken shape through the expansion of labour recruitment, it 
is possible to see an ongoing process of re-regulation that aims to control and 
professionalize recruiters on a number of different levels.
In China, the expansion of the space of mediation was driven by liberaliza-
tion on two fronts, individual outmigration and migration brokerage. The policy 
consensus in the 1990s was that migration must be made freer. First, nearly 
twenty administrative procedures in the passport application were cut out, and 
by 2005 most urban residents were able to apply for a passport by presenting 
their identity cards. The Passport Law, effective from January 2007, enshrined 
every citizen’s legal entitlement to possess a passport. As a result, the annual 
outflow of labour migrants increased from 253,000 in 2000 (China International 
Contractors’ Association, 2004: 10) to 530,000 in 2015 (China International 
Contractors’ Association, 2016: 5.). Second, in 2002 there was a watershed 
policy change regarding labour recruitment companies, which were allowed into 
the business while at the same time public and government institutions were 
banned from the business in order to maintain the integrity of both the market 
and state. The number of licensed companies increased from four in 1979, all 
state-owned (Zhang Gesheng, 1999: 206), to about 3,000 in 2010, though the 
number dropped to about 1,000 afterwards.13
The Chinese government thus consciously attempted to govern migration 
through commercial intermediaries. But this obviously presented challenges. 
Unlike the pre-reform era when licensed companies were state-owned and 
obliged to follow government orders, the newly licensed companies are inde-
pendent enterprises. Furthermore, while the government could previously stop 
companies from sending workers at a moment’s notice by withholding project 
approvals or workers’ passports, the liberalization of exit control meant this was 
no longer feasible. In this context, the government regarded clear, pre-set and 
impartial rules, rather than via ad hoc, direct and arbitrary interventions, as the 
way forward. Licensing is the central practical leverage through which the state 
regulates the migration brokerage. All companies must meet sets of strict criteria 
13 The 3,000 recruitment companies included those licensed by the ministries of 
commerce, labor, transport (specializing in sea farers) and health (specializing in nurse 
migration). Companies licensed by the ministries of education and public security (for 
permanent emigration and general-purpose border crossing) sometimes engaged in 
labor migration as well (estimate based on CHINCA, 2004-2012; Center for International 
Exchanges, Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2008; Xia Hong, 2012:52).
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to be licensed. They are subject to annual reviews, and those who fail to provide 
satisfactory documentary evidence about their business performance are deli-
censed. Regulators placed great emphasis on companies’ capacity. They identi-
fied companies’ financial capacity as the foundation for business success and 
the determinant of their credibility. “What is credibility?” the official in Liaoning 
province asked, “If you have the [financial] capacity to pay the full compensation 
[in case of failure in service], you have the credibility. If you can’t compensate, 
what credibility can you talk about?” The labour ministry set the national policy 
in 2002 that all agents had to pay a minimum financial bond of USD 60,000 when 
applying for licenses, a figure that has increased nearly ten-fold since.14
Apart from the stress on financial capacity, the Ministry of Labour urged all 
agents to develop the “capacity of resisting risks.” All companies were required 
to submit a report on their “emergency coping mechanisms” when applying 
for licenses from 2005 onwards. The report details the procedure, the division 
of labour, the staff and the telephone numbers designated, and the budget 
earmarked for dealing with emergencies such as when workers stage strikes 
overseas. A much more difficult requirement in the license application is that 
agents must have appointed their legal representatives in destination countries. 
In addition, it is compulsory that intermediary companies have staff with work 
experience in international relations and career development. The government 
also stressed strict documentation procedure. For instance, licensed interme-
diary companies were required to submit their Service Agreements (between 
agents and migrants), Employment Contracts (between foreign employers and 
migrants), proof of the overseas employer’s legal status and the foreign govern-
ment’s permissions for hiring migrant workers. The companies also have to 
declare that they have checked all the details in the contracts against laws and 
regulations of the local government, the national government, and in the desti-
nation country. Obviously only a small number of intermediaries could meet 
these requirements. The scientific regulation was inevitably exclusive. It rein-
forced the monopoly position of the windows. This unintentionally complicated 
the space of mediation. What emerged was a multi-layered system of “inter-
mediary chains.” At the top of the chain are window companies in major cities. 
They sign contracts with foreign firms and process the legal paperwork that 
was necessary for outmigration, but outsourced the task of labour recruitment 
to middle-level agents in the prefectures, who in turn subcontract to subagents 
in local districts or rural townships, who are referred to colloquially as “the 
legs,” akin to the Indonesian petugas lapangan. When the overseas employer 
complains to the recruitment agent in the destination country about a migrant, 
the foreign agent pressures the window company to seek quick solutions, and 
the “window” often passes the task downward to the “leg,” who disciplines the 
migrant transnationally by pressuring the migrant’s family in the home country.
14 Liaoning province, for example, doubled the minimum bond from the national level 
of USD 60,000 in 2002 to USD 120,000 in 2007. The national level was then raised to USD 
500,000 in 2012 (State Council, 2012). Ministry of Labor. 2002 [Decree No. 7]. Provincial 
Rules on Security Bond for International Labor Cooperation. In Liaoning, the agent must 
deposit the bond with a designated bank. The bank, the agent and the provincial labor 
bureau sign a three-party legal contract that forbids the bank and the agent from with-
drawing the money without the government’s permission, but authorizes the government 
to use the money to deal with emergencies caused by the agent, particularly to compen-
sate for migrants’ losses.
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The space of mediation is still evolving. In 2010, the State Council designated 
the Ministry of Commerce as the single authority to oversee land-based labour 
outmigration. The Ministry of Commerce cut down the number of licensed 
companies significantly, partly aimed at driving those connected to other minis-
tries, especially the Ministry of Labour, out of the business. At the same time the 
Ministry of Commerce launched a campaign to set up “labour service platforms” 
at the county level, and by the end of 2015, there were 310 such platforms 
across the country (CHICA, 2016: 14). The platforms are networks of government 
departments coordinated by a specially created government agency, which have 
direct access to the labour force and to window companies, and are thus able 
to process the entire recruitment procedure. In other words, it aims to create a 
new regulatory infrastructure to “flatten” the multi-layered commercial infra-
structure. It remains to be seen how this will affect the intermediary business 
and labour outmigration in general.
Simultaneous deregulation and re-regulation as demonstrated in both 
Indonesia and China represents a common policy trajectory among a number 
of Asian countries. In the era of globalization, developmental states deregulate 
the economy in order to join the global market, but at the same time reintro-
duce regulations in order to safeguard their economic sovereignty or capture 
profits. In Indonesia and China, labour migration mediation is deregulated by 
opening space for private actors and adopting market mechanisms. This is 
aimed at promoting outmigration for developmental goals. At the same time 
the business is reregulated in order to protect migrants’ rights and to reinforce 
government’s executive power. Licensing turns out to be the chief method of 
achieving simultaneous de-regulation and re-regulation. Those who are licensed 
are supposed to be professionally qualified and will therefore mediate labour 
outmigration in ethical and efficient ways. Although unlicensed entities are still 
an important part of the scene, they work as subagents of licensed companies 
and are closely monitored. In sum, the space of mediation has both privatized 
and professionalized.
Conclusion
Migration should not be understood as constituting migrants’ activities per se. 
Migrations in modern times are to a great extent constituted by multiple actors 
other than migrants. These actors are interconnected and thus create a “space 
of mediation”. Based on historical comparison between Indonesia and China, 
this article shows that the composition and dynamic of such space has changed 
over time, which is an integral part of the changing political order in general. 
Before the mid-twentieth century, the space of mediation arose in response to 
the emerging modern statecraft that was alien to the local society. The space 
of mediation linked the process of migration to the administrative regulation 
imposed from above and afar. At the same time the space of mediation was 
sufficiently distanced from the power that it could become a site of resistance 
and even revolutionary activities. The space of mediation shrank dramatically 
after Indonesia and China became full sovereign nation-states that administered 
migration processes directly. After the 1990s, outmigration was encouraged, exit 
control liberalized, and migration increased significantly. The most important 
consequence of liberalization, however, has been the growth and complication 
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of the intermediary business. As we have documented elsewhere, the migration 
intermediary industry increased much faster than migration itself in both China 
and Indonesia (Xiang and Lindquist, 2014). The space of mediation has once 
again assumed a central role in low-skilled labour migration.
The space of mediation and the state are not in opposition. The space of 
mediation did not necessarily contract when the state expanded, nor did it 
necessarily “bounce back” when the state retreated. As our historical compar-
ison shows, it was the collapse of the traditional order and the efforts of modern 
state building that gave rise to the space of mediation in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century. Similarly, the growth of the space of mediation 
since the 1990s is accompanied by increasingly sophisticated regulation in both 
countries. As such, it is more productive to investigate how state and non-state 
actors overlap, rather than how they are separated. This allows us also to 
distinguish our work from the work of scholars such as Peck and Tickel (2002), 
who conceptualize the “roll-back” and “roll-out” of the state strictly in relation 
to recent processes of neoliberalization. As Huang has put it in his research on 
Chinese history, “contrary to the vision of the public sphere/civil society models, 
actual socio-political change in China has really never come from any lasting 
assertion of societal autonomy against the state, but rather from the workings 
out of state-society relations in the third realm” (Huang, 1993: 238). By the “third 
realm” Huang means a space that is distinct from state and society but which 
both participate in. Examples include the imperial justice system in which the 
state endorsed community arbitrations, which was how the majority civil cases 
were settled, and the rural gentry class under the county level who represented 
both state interests and local concerns. The space of mediation can be seen as 
part of the third realm.
By construing the space of migration mediation as a site where bureaucratic 
operations and social activities co-evolve, our comparison also sheds light on 
the question of whether the current era of globalization is a continuation or 
even repetition of the developments of the nineteenth century. History has not 
simply gone through a cycle. The contemporary space of mediation differs from 
the link society in multiple ways. The space of mediation after the 1990s is to a 
great extent based on the social infrastructure built by the state. The petugas 
lapangan was cultivated by the Indonesian state during the New Order, and in 
China the space of mediation was developed primarily through the corporatiza-
tion of government agencies. Most privately-owned intermediaries were once 
state-owned, and their unlicensed sub-agents were often government agencies 
or public institutions (such as vocational schools). The “legs” were usually 
persons who enjoyed public authority such as retired cadres or school teachers. 
The connections with the state ran deep and wide. As such, the era of national 
development was decisive in shaping on-going transnational flows and connec-
tions. The increase of labour migration after the 1990s is more an expansion of 
national development projects than a “return” to the pre-nation state models.
Will the contemporary space of mediation become more autonomous in 
time? For instance, will rights-focused NGOs in Indonesia play a countervailing 
role against commercial intermediaries? Will the new “labour service platforms” 
in China become a basis for reorganizing public life at the grassroots level? Or 
will NGOs, now extremely weak in China, one day emerge to put state power 
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in check? These questions can only be addressed by further empirical research. 
They are clearly not unique to labour outmigration, and are related to such 
issues as the roles of political parties and local-central relations. As such, the 
notion of space of mediation may provide a tool for investigating more general 
social transformations that take place on multiple fronts but often appear contra-
dictory, as we are witnessing in many Asian countries today.
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Space of Mediation: Labour Migration, Intermediaries and the 
State in Indonesia and China since the Nineteenth Century
It is increasingly recognized that a focus on how migration is mediated by non-
migrants can provide a critical lens for examining the relationship between 
migration and broader social change. This article develops this approach 
further by examining the mediation process historically and comparatively. 
We compare the evolution of the complex relations among multiple actors that 
shape mobilities through what we call the “space of mediation”, using the case 
of low-skilled international labour outmigration from Indonesia and China since 
the nineteenth century. In both countries, the space of mediation before the 
mid-twentieth century was large, quasi-autonomous, and poorly regulated. The 
space was brought under the control of centralized state in the second half of 
the twentieth century, and then bifurcated into state-managed labour exports 
and undocumented outmigration. On entering the twenty-first century, the 
space of mediation has become both privatized and professionalized, and more 
expansive, integrated and regulated.
L’espace de la médiation : intermédiaires et État 
en Indonésie et en Chine depuis le XIXe siècle
Il est de plus en plus reconnu que la manière dont la migration est médiatisée par 
les non-migrants fournit une perspective critique pour examiner la relation entre 
la migration et le changement social plus large. Cet article examine le processus 
de médiation d’un point de vue historique et comparatif. Il compare l’évolution 
des relations complexes entre les multiples acteurs qui façonnent les mobilités à 
travers ce que nous appelons « l’espace de la médiation », dans le cas de l’émigra-
tion internationale de main-d’œuvre peu qualifiée d’Indonésie et de Chine depuis 
le XIXe siècle. Dans les deux pays, l’espace de la médiation avant le milieu du 
XXe siècle était vaste, quasi autonome et mal réglementé. L’espace a été placé 
sous le contrôle de l’État centralisé dans la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, puis a 
bifurqué vers des exportations de main-d’œuvre gérées par l’État et une émigra-
tion clandestine sans papiers. À l’aube du XXIe siècle, l’espace de la médiation est 
devenu à la fois privatisé et professionnalisé, plus étendu, intégré et réglementé.
Espacio de mediación: migración laboral, intermediarios 
y el Estado en Indonesia y China desde el siglo XIX
Se reconoce cada vez más que un enfoque en la forma en que la migración es 
mediada por los no migrantes puede proporcionar una perspectiva crítica para 
examinar la relación entre la migración y el cambio social más amplio. Este 
artículo desarrolla este enfoque examinando el proceso de mediación histórica 
y comparativamente. Comparamos la evolución de las complejas relaciones 
entre múltiples actores que conforman las movilidades a través de lo que 
llamamos el «espacio de mediación», utilizando el caso de la emigración laboral 
internacional de baja cualificación desde Indonesia y China desde el siglo XIX. 
En ambos países, el espacio de mediación antes de mediados del siglo XX era 
amplio, casi autónomo y mal regulado. El espacio fue puesto bajo el control 
del estado centralizado en la segunda mitad del siglo XX, y luego bifurcado en 
exportaciones de mano de obra manejadas por el estado y emigración indocu-
mentada. Al entrar en el siglo XXI, el espacio de la mediación se ha privatizado 
y profesionalizado, y se ha vuelto más amplio, integrado y regulado.
